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Semantics for Analytic Containment
Abstract. In 1977, R. B. Angell presented a logic for analytic containment, a notion of
\relevant" implication stronger than Anderson and Belnap’s entailment. In this paper I
provide for the rst time the logic of rst degree analytic containment, as presented in
[2] and [3], with a semantical characterization|leaving higher degree systems for future
investigations. The semantical framework I introduce for this purpose involves a special
sort of truth{predicates, which apply to pairs of collections of formulas instead of individual
formulas, and which behave in some respects like Gentzen’s sequents. This semantics
captures very general properties of the truth{functional connectives, and for that reason
it may be used to model a vast range of logics. I briefly illustrate the point with classical
consequence and Anderson and Belnap’s \tautological entailments".
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1. Analytic Containment
Analytic containment, as R. B. Angell understands the notion, is that re-
lation which holds between two sentences, when the meaning of the rst
contains the meaning of the second: p analytically contains q i the mean-
ing of p contains the meaning of q.1
In [2] and [3], Angell devised his system AC as a logic of analytic con-
tainment.
Angell actually introduced two systems under the label ‘AC’. Both are
formulated in a classical propositional language with negation (:) and con-
junction (^) as primitive truth{functional connectives, augmented by the
binary operator $ representing mutual analytic containment (sameness of
meaning). The formation rules of the 1977 system are as expected: the atoms
are formulas, and if A and B are formulas, then :A, A ^B and A $ B are
formulas. The formulas of the 1989 system are only those of the form A $ B,
where A and B contain only truth{functional compounds of atoms. Analytic
containment (!) is in both systems dened by A ! B =df A $ (A ^ B).
The theorems of the 1989 system all have the form A $ B, while the 1977
system also includes classical logic, but no specic axioms or rules for formu-
1 [3], p. 119.
Fabrice Correia
1Published in Studia Logica 77, issue 1, 87-104, 2004
which should be used for any reference to this work
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
las with nested $. The latter system thus essentially embodies properties
of rst degree analytic containment.
In this paper I shall focus on the 1989 system, and on the rst degree
fragment of the 1977 system (which was actually Angell’s center of interest
in [2]), and the aim is basically to provide them with semantical characteri-
zations. I shall leave the task of dealing with systems involving formulas of
arbitrary degrees for future work.
It is perhaps worth saying a word or two about what analytic contain-
ment is. Angell’s informal denition of analytic containment is not very
perspicuous. For instance, in one sense, the meaning of a sentence is con-
tained in the meaning of its negation. But it is clear that Angell does not
want to say that for any sentence p, :p analytically contains p. (\Proof":
his systems would represent the principle as a theorem, but they do not.)
As far as I can see, analytic containment amounts to this: sentence p
analytically contains sentence q when one can \extract" the information
given by q from the information given by p only by looking at the meaning
of the components of p and q|or again, more objectively, when in virtue
of the meaning of the constituents of p and q, the information given by q is
carried by, or is part of, the information given by p.
It may be thought that in the above explication reference to meanings is
useless. For, one might argue, information containment is always a question
of meaning: for any sentences p and q, if the information given by p contains
the information given by q, then this is true in virtue of what p and q mean.
However, reference to meanings allows one to formulate a certain distinc-
tion between two notions of analytic containment which, I think, is worth
formulating. One of these notions is the one which has been dened above
(keep on calling it ‘analytic containment’), the other one is stronger and we
shall call it ‘logical containment’. Logical containment is related to analytic
containment as logical truth to analytic truth. An analytic truth (e.g. ‘Sam
is a man if Sam is a bachelor’) is a sentence true in virtue of the meaning of
its components; a logical truth (e.g. ‘Sam is a man if Sam is a man and Sam
likes chocolate’) is a sentence true in virtue of the meaning of its logical com-
ponents. Similarly, sentence q (e.g. ‘Sam is a man’) is analytically contained
in sentence p (e.g. ‘Sam is a bachelor’) when one can extract the information
given by q from the information given by p by looking at the meaning of the
components of p and q; and sentence q (e.g. ‘Sam is a man’) is logically
contained in sentence p (e.g. ‘Sam is a man and Sam likes chocolate’) when
one can extract the information given by q from the information given by p
only by looking at the meaning of the logical components of p and q.
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Although the two notions are distinct, in each of Angell’s systems !
may be interpreted indierently as analytic containment or as logical con-
tainment.
2. The System AC
My formulation of Angell’s 1989 system is somewhat dierent than his own,
but the dierences are minor. In the sequel, ‘system AC’ will denote my
version of the system.
We start with a classical propositional language L with primitive opera-
tors : and _ (^ is dened in the usual way in terms of : and _) augmented
with the binary operator ! representing analytic containment. The formu-
las of the system are all truth{functional compounds of atoms, plus every
formula of type A ! B, where A and B contain no occurrence of !. In
what follows, I shall use A, B, ... for formulas containing no arrows, and I
shall call them ‘TFFs’.
System AC is then dened by the following axiom schemata and rules
(here and below, any occurrence of ! has to be understood as having the
widest possible scope):
A ! ::A (AC1a)
::A ! A (AC1b)
A ! A ^A (AC2)
A ^B ! A (AC3)
A _B ! B _A (AC4)
A _ (B _ C) ! (A _B) _ C (AC5a)
(A _B) _ C ! A _ (B _ C) (AC5b)
A _ (B ^ C) ! (A _B) ^ (A _ C) (AC6a)
(A _B) ^ (A _ C) ! A _ (B ^ C) (AC6b)
A ! B;B ! A = :A ! :B (AC7)
A ! B = A _ C ! B _ C (AC8)
A ! B;B ! C = A ! C (AC9)
We shall use ‘A ‘ B’ to mean that A ! B is a theorem of AC, and ‘A a‘ B’
to mean that both A ‘ B and B ‘ A. One can then prove:
A ‘ A (T1)
A a‘ A ^A (T2)
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A a‘ A _A (T3)
A _B a‘ B _A (T4)
A ^B a‘ B ^A (T5)
A ^ (B ^ C) a‘ (A ^B) ^ C (T6)
A ^ (B _ C) a‘ (A ^B) _ (A ^C) (T7)
A ^B ‘ A _B (T8)
A ^ (B _ C) ‘ A _B (T9)
A ‘ B ^ C i A ‘ B and A ‘ C (T10)
If A ‘ B and C ‘ D, then A ^ C ‘ B ^D (T11)
If A ‘ B and C ‘ D, then A _ C ‘ B _D (T12)
If A ‘ B and A ‘ C _D, then A ‘ B _ C (T13)
If A a‘ B, then :A a‘ :B (T14)
If A a‘ B, then A ^ C a‘ B ^ C (T15)
If A a‘ B, then A _ C a‘ B _ C (T16)
If A a‘ B, then C a‘ C[A=B], where C[A=B] is the result of
replacing some occurrences of B in C by A (T17)
C a‘ C[::A=A] (same notation as above) (T18)
For a comparison, Angell’s original system in [3] is formulated as follows
(with mutual analytic containment$ taken as primitive, and A ! B dened
as A $ (A ^B)):
A $ ::A
A $ A ^A
A ^B $ B ^A
A ^ (B ^ C) $ (A ^B) ^ C
A _ (B ^ C) $ (A _B) ^ (A _ C)
A $ B; X = X[A=B];where X[A=B] is the result of replacing some
occurrences of B in X by A
It is easy to see that theoremhood in system AC formalizes a notion of
consequence which is strictly stronger than classical consequence: if A ‘ B,
then B is a classical consequence of A, but the converse does not hold. In
fact, as one can check from the list of axioms, A ‘ B only if all atoms in B
appear in A. Analytic containment is a form of \relevant" implication: in
particular, neither of A ! B _ :B and A ^ :A ! B is derivable.
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One important feature of AC is that A ! A_B is not derivable. This is
a crucial dierence with Anderson and Belnap’s system Efde for \tautological
entailment".2 Actually, Efde is just AC plus axiom A ! A _B.3.
3. Semantics for AC
One natural idea to model analytic containment is to follow a standard way
of modelling e.g. classical consequence: introduce a certain kind of models
which assign certain semantic properties to the atoms of the language, then
recursively dene a notion of truth in a model for all TFFs, in such a way
that A ‘ B i B is true in every model where A is true. This is the way I
am going to proceed.
Such a semantical treatment of analytic containment meets some di-
culties, mainly because of the behavior of disjunction. Given the fact that
A ! A _B is not derivable in AC, the truth of A in a model m should not
yield the truth in m of A _B for any arbitrary B. This means that, in the
present context, we must do without the familiar sounding truth{clause for
disjunction ‘A _B is true in m i A is true in m or B is true in m’.
The semantics I present in this section is very unusual. In this semantics,
instead of assigning semantic properties to individual atoms (like e.g. having
or lacking this or that truth{value), the models assign semantic properties to
collections of atoms|more precisely, to pairs of such collections. Relative to
any model, a truth predicate which applies to pairs of collections of formulas
is dened, as well as a truth predicate which applies to individual formulas|
the second being dened in terms of the rst.
More concretely, we dene a valuation on language L as a set of pairs of
nite subsets of the set At of all atoms of L. For any given valuation v, we
dene a truth predicate which applies to arbitrary pairs of nite sets of TFFs,
v. For the sake of readability, I shall write Γ v  instead of v (hΓ;i),
and I shall use a standard convention used in sequent calculi of using commas
instead of union signs, and of omitting the set{theoretical brackets around
TFFs. ‘Γ v ’ should be read ‘according to v, the disjunction of all the
negated members of Γ and of all the members of  is true’. As the reader will
see, the analogy with sequents goes beyond the above notational convention.
The denition of v is as follows:
1. If Γ and  are sets of atoms, then Γ v  i hΓ;i 2 v;
2 See [1], ch. III, S15. The theorems of Efde are all the formulas of type A ! B (where
A and B are TFFs) which are theorems of system E for entailment.
3 See [2].
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2. (a) Γ v ;:A i Γ; A v ;
(b) Γ;:A v  i Γ v ; A;
3. (a) Γ v ; A _B i Γ v ; A;B;
(b) Γ; A _B v  i both Γ; A v  and Γ; B v .
The clause for conjunction is then:
 { Γ v ; A ^B i both Γ v ; A and Γ v ; B;
{ Γ; A ^B v  i Γ; A;B v .
Finally, we shall say that TFF A is true in valuation v|for short, v A|i
? v A. Note that no TFF is true in every valuation. Also note that truth
in a valuation has a special behavior with respect to disjunction (but not
conjunction): from the truth of A one cannot in general infer the truth of
A_B, and conversely from the truth of A_B one cannot infer that A is true
or B is true.4 Truth in a valuation behaves in this respect like membership
to a (real) belief set: you may believe that Sam is either at home or at the
stadium without having a belief as to exactly where he is; and you may
believe that Sam is at home without believing that he is at home or the
number of pens in my oce is 7.
Arbitrary valuations, though, are not appropriate for modelling analytic
containment in the way suggested at the beginning of this section. For let
p, q and r be atoms of L. By (T9) p ^ (q _ r) ‘ p _ q. Now let v be the
valuation whose sole members are h?; fpgi and h?; fq; rgi. Then v p^(q_r)
but 2v p _ q. We need valuations of a certain kind, which I shall call AC{
valuations.
An AC{valuation is a valuation which satises the following condition:
 for all sets of atoms Γ, Γ0, Γ00, , 0, 00, if hΓ;i 2 v and hΓ0 [
Γ00;0 [00i 2 v, then hΓ [ Γ0; [0i 2 v.
Let us say that A semantically contains B|for short A  B|i B is true
in every AC{valuation where A is true. The next two sections are devoted
to showing that A ‘ B i A  B|in other words, that AC is both sound
and complete with respect to the semantics of AC{valuations.
4. Soundness
The soundness of AC with respect to the previous semantics|i.e. the fact
that A ‘ B entails A  B|will be proved indirectly.
4 Of course, taking ‘A is false in v’ to mean ‘:A is true in v’, the dual claim about
conjunction holds as well: falsity in a valuation has a special behavior with respect to
conjunction (but not disjunction).
6
Where v is a valuation, let us say that A v B i for every nite set of
TFFs Γ, the following two conditions hold:
 If Γ v A, then Γ v B;
 A v Γ i A;B v Γ.
We shall rst prove that for every AC{valuation v, if A ‘ B then A v
B. Then given that for every valuation v, if A v B, then v A implies
v B, this will establish the soundness of AC with respect to the proposed
semantics.5
We shall need the following important proposition, which says that the
dening condition of AC{valuations described in the previous section trans-
mits from atoms to arbitrary TFFs:
Proposition 4.1. Let v be an AC{valuation. Then for all sets of TFFs Γ,
Γ0, Γ00, , 0, 00, if Γ v  and Γ0;Γ00 v 0;00, then Γ;Γ0 v ;0.
Proof. Let the degree of a TFF A be the natural number d(A) recursively
dened by the following 3 clauses: (i) if A is an atom, then d(A) = 0; (ii)
d(:A) = 1 + d(A); (iii) d(A _ B) = 1 + maxfd(A); d(B)g. The degree of a
set Γ of TFFs is then dened as maxfd(A) : A 2 Γg. One may prove the
proposition by induction on the degree of Γ [ Γ0 [ Γ00 [ [0 [00 in the
following way. Let v be an AC{valuation. Then by denition, proposition 1
holds when Γ[Γ0[Γ00[[0[00 is of degree 0. Suppose now that it holds
whenever Γ[ Γ0 [ Γ00 [ [0 [00 is of degree  n, and let Γ;Γ0;Γ00;;0
and 00 be such that their union is of degree n + 1. Then each set Ψ among
the above 6 may be decomposed into three components: Ψ1, the set of all
TFFs in Ψ of degree  n; Ψ2, the set of all TFFs in Ψ of the form :A of
degree n + 1; and Ψ3, the set of all TFFs in Ψ of the form A _B of degree
n + 1.
Before proceeding further, some denitions are in order. In what follows,
where Ψ is any set of TFFs of form :A, ‘Ψ’ will denote the set of all TFFs
A such that :A 2 Ψ; and where Ψ is any set of TFFs of form A _ B, ‘bΨ’
will denote the set of all TFFs A such that for some TFF B, A _B 2 Ψ or
B _A 2 Ψ. In case Ψ is empty, both ‘Ψ’ and ‘bΨ’ will denote the empty set.
Finally, let Ψ be any set of cardinal n  2, containing only TFFs of form
A _B. Assume a numbering of all the disjunctions of L, and say that Ψ is
fA1 _B1, ..., An _Bng, where the indices respect the numbering. Then let
Ψ0 be fA1; B1g  :::fAn; Bng. Where  is any n-tuple ha1; :::; ani, let s()
5 On the use of , see Remark I on page 98.
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be fa1; :::; ang. Then we let −!Ψ be fs() :  2 Ψ0g. (It should be clear that
the choice of the original numbering is immaterial, i.e. if
−!
Ψ1 is obtained
from a given numbering and
−!
Ψ2 from another, then
−!
Ψ1 =
−!
Ψ2.) In case
Ψ contains only one element A _ B, we let −!Ψ be ffAg; fBgg. In case Ψ is
empty, we put
−!
Ψ = f?g.
Then suppose that
1. Γ v , and
2. Γ0;Γ00 v 0;00.
Then:
1. Γ1;Γ2;Γ3 v 1;2;3, and
2. Γ01;Γ02;Γ03;Γ001 ;Γ002 ;Γ003 v 01;02;03;001;002 ;003 .
So:
1. 8x 2 −!Γ3 Γ1; x;2 v 1; c3;Γ2, and
2. 8y 2 −!Γ03 8z 2
−!
Γ003 Γ
0
1; y;
0
2;Γ
00
1 ; z;
00
2 v 01; c03;Γ02;001 ; c003 ;Γ002.
Then by induction hypothesis, for all x 2 −!Γ3, y 2
−!
Γ03 and z 2
−!
Γ003 :
 Γ1; x;2;Γ01; y;02 v 1; c3;Γ2;01; c03;Γ02,
i.e.:
 Γ1;Γ2; x;Γ01;Γ02; y v 1;2;3;01;02;03.
But this implies that: Γ1;Γ2;Γ3;Γ01;Γ02;Γ03 v 1;2;3;01;02;03, i.e.
that Γ;Γ0 v ;0.
Proposition 4.2. For every AC{valuation v and all TFFs A and B, if
A ‘ B, then A v B.
Proof. It suces to prove that for every AC{valuation v, (i) every axiom
of AC A ! B is such that A v B, and (ii) that every rule of inference of
AC A1 ! B1; A2 ! B2; ::: = A ! B is such that if A1 v B1, A2 v B2, ...,
then A v B. Point (i) is obvious for (AC1a){(AC5b). For the remaining
cases, let v be an AC{valuation.
1. (for (AC6a) and (AC6b)) For any arbitrary nite set of TFFs Γ, and
TFFs A, B and C, we have:
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(a) Γ v A _ (B ^ C) i Γ v A;B and Γ v A;C;
(b) Γ v (A _B) ^ (A _ C) i Γ v A;B and Γ v A;C;
(c) A _ (B ^ C) v Γ i A v Γ and B;C v Γ;
(d) (A _ B) ^ (A _ C) v Γ i A v Γ, B;C v Γ, A;B v Γ and
A;C v Γ;
(e) A _ (B ^ C); (A _ B) ^ (A _ C) v Γ i A v Γ, B;C v Γ,
A;B v Γ, A;C v Γ and A;B;C v Γ.
By (a) and (b), Γ v A_ (B^C) i Γ v (A_B)^ (A_C). By (c) and
(e), if A_(B^C); (A_B)^(A_C) v Γ, then A_(B^C) v Γ; and the
converse holds by proposition 4.1. By (d) and (e), if A_ (B ^C); (A_
B) ^ (A _ C) v Γ, then (A _ B) ^ (A _ C) v Γ; and once again the
converse holds by proposition 4.1. So, A_(B^C) v (A_B)^(A_C)
and (A _B) ^ (A _ C) v A _ (B ^ C).
2. (for (AC7)) Suppose that both A v B and B v A, i.e. that for every
nite set of TFFs Γ the following three conditions hold:
(a) Γ v A i Γ v B;
(b) A v Γ i A;B v Γ;
(c) B v Γ i A;B v Γ.
Then let Γ be a nite set of TFFs. (i) Suppose that Γ v :A. Then
A v Γ, where Γ = f:C : C 2 Γg. By (b) and (c), it follows that
B v Γ, and so that Γ v :B. (ii) Suppose now that :A v Γ.
Then Γ v A. By (a), it follows that Γ v B, and thus :B v Γ.
By proposition 4.1, we have then :A;:B v Γ. (iii) Suppose that
:A;:B v Γ. Then Γ;:A v B, and so by (a) Γ;:A v A, i.e.
:A v Γ By (i), (ii) and (iii), :A v :B.
3. (for (AC8)) Suppose that A v B, i.e. that for every nite set of
TFFs Γ,
(a) if Γ v A, then Γ v B;
(b) A v Γ i A;B v Γ.
Then let Γ be a nite set of TFFs. (i) Suppose that Γ v A_C. Then
Γ;:C v A, and so by (a), Γ;:C v B. Consequently, Γ v B _ C.
(ii) Suppose that A _C v Γ. Then both A v Γ and C v Γ. By (b),
A;B v Γ. By proposition 4.1, we also have A;C v Γ and B;C v Γ.
It follows that A_C;B_C v Γ. (iii) Suppose that A_C;B_C v Γ.
Then A;B v Γ and C v Γ. By (b) and A;B v Γ, we have A v Γ.
So, A _ C v Γ. By (i), (ii) and (iii), A _ C v B _C.
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4. (for (AC9)) Suppose that both A v B and B v C, i.e. that for
every nite set of TFFs Γ,
(a) if Γ v A, then Γ v B;
(b) A v Γ i A;B v Γ;
(c) if Γ v B, then Γ v C;
(d) B v Γ i B;C v Γ.
Then let Γ be a nite set of TFFs. (i) By (a) and (c), if Γ v A, then
Γ v C. (ii) Suppose that A v Γ. Then by (b), A;B v Γ, and so
B v Γ;:A. By (d), it follows that B;C v Γ;:A, and so A;B;C v Γ.
From this and the fact that A v Γ, by proposition 4.1 it follows that
A;C v Γ. (iii) Suppose that A;C v Γ. Then A v Γ;:C. By (b), it
follows that A;B v Γ;:C, and so B;C v Γ;:A. By (d), it follows
that B v Γ;:A, and so A;B v Γ. Finally by (b), A v Γ. By (i),
(ii) and (iii), A v C.
We can then conclude:
Proposition 4.3. (Soundness) For all TFFs A and B, if A ‘ B, then
A  B.
5. Completeness
Let Γ be an arbitrary non-empty, nite set of TFFs. We dene the notion
of a Γ{formula recursively as follows:
 All TFFs in Γ are Γ{formulas;
 If A and B are Γ{formulas, then so is A _B.
A maximal Γ{formula is a Γ{formula containing all TFFs in Γ (a given TFF
may appear several times in a maximal Γ{formula). It is clear that in system
AC, any two maximal Γ{formulas A and B are such that A a‘ B. We shall
call this principle Disjunctive Equivalence.
To every non{empty nite set of TFFs Γ, we associate a given maximal
Γ{formula we call Γ+ (say, the rst such formula according to an initial
numbering of all the TFFs). We put Γ− = f:A : A 2 Γg+. In what
follows, every occurrence of an expression like ‘Γ− _ A’ or ‘A _ Γ−’ should
be understood as ‘A’ if the set Γ is empty. And similarly, every occurrence
of an expression like ‘+_A’ or ‘A_+’ should be understood as ‘A’ if the
set  is empty.
For every TFF A, let v(A) be the set dened as follows:
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 hΓ;i 2 v(A) i Γ [  6= ?, Γ [  is a nite set of atoms, and
A ‘ (Γ− _+).
v(A) is obviously a valuation.
Proposition 5.1. For all nite sets of TFFs Γ and  such that Γ[ 6= ?,
Γ v(A)  i A ‘ (Γ− _+).
Proof. In order to prove this, it is enough to prove the following four
claims:
 A ‘ Γ− _ (;:B)+ i A ‘ (Γ; B)− _+;
 A ‘ (Γ;:B)− _+ i A ‘ Γ− _ (; B)+;
 A ‘ Γ− _ (; B _ C)+ i A ‘ Γ− _ (; B;C)+;
 A ‘ (Γ; B _ C)− _+ i A ‘ (Γ; B)− _+ and A ‘ (Γ; C)− _+.
Given (AC9) and (T10), it is enough to prove the following:
1. Γ− _ (;:B)+ a‘ (Γ; B)− _+;
2. (Γ;:B)− _+ a‘ Γ− _ (; B)+;
3. Γ− _ (; B _ C)+ a‘ Γ− _ (; B;C)+;
4. (Γ; B _ C)− _+ a‘ [(Γ; B)− _+] ^ [(Γ; C)− _+].
Points 1 and 3 directly follow from Disjunctive Equivalence. For the
remaining two points:
 By Disjunctive Equivalence, (Γ;:B)−_+ a‘ ::B_ (Γ−_+).
By (T18) and (AC9), it follows that (Γ;:B)−_+ a‘ B_ (Γ−_+).
By Disjunctive Equivalence, Γ−_(; B)+ a‘ B_(Γ−_+). The
result follows from (AC9).
 By Disjunctive Equivalence, (Γ; B _ C)− _ + a‘ :(B _ C) _
(Γ− _ +). By (T18), (AC9) and the denition of conjunction, it
follows that (Γ; B _C)−_+ a‘ (:B^:C)_ (Γ−_+), and thus by
Disjunctive Equivalence and (AC9), (Γ; B _ C)− _+ a‘ (Γ− _
+) _ (:B ^ :C). By (AC6a), (AC6b) and (AC9), we have then
(Γ; B _ C)− _ + a‘ ((Γ− _ +) _ :B) ^ ((Γ− _ +) _ :C). Now
by Disjunctive Equivalence, ((Γ−_+)_:B) a‘ ((Γ; B)−_+)
and ((Γ− _+)_:C) a‘ ((Γ; C)− _+). So by (T11) and (AC9), we
have (Γ; B _ C)− _+ a‘ ((Γ; B)− _+) ^ ((Γ; C)− _+).
Proposition 5.2. For all TFFs A and B, A ‘ B i v(A) B.
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Proof. By proposition 5.1, v(A) B i A ‘ fBg+. But by Disjunctive
Equivalence and (AC9), A ‘ fBg+ i A ‘ B.
Proposition 5.3. v(A) is an AC{valuation.
Proof. Suppose that hΓ;i 2 v(A) and hΓ0 [ Γ00;0 [00i 2 v(A). Then
Γ [ 6= ? and Γ0 [ Γ00 [0 [00 6= ?. It also follows that
1. A ‘ Γ− _+, and
2. A ‘ (Γ0;Γ00)− _ (0;00)+.
In order to prove that hΓ [ Γ0; [ 0i 2 v(A), we have to establish that
A ‘ (Γ;Γ0)− _ (;0)+.
CASE 1: Γ0 [0 = ?. The result is immediate.
CASE 2: Γ00 [00 = ? (and so, Γ0 [0 6= ?). By (1), (2), (T12), (T3)
and (AC9), A ‘ (Γ− _ +) _ (Γ0− _ 0+). CASE 2a: Γ [ Γ0 6= ? and
 [ 0 6= ?. By Disjunctive Equivalence and (AC9), it follows that
A ‘ (Γ;Γ0)− _ (;0)+. CASE 2b: Γ [ Γ0 = ? (and so,  [ 0 6= ?).
Then A ‘ + _0+. By Disjunctive Equivalence and (AC9), it follows
that A ‘ (;0)+. CASE 2c:  [ 0 = ? (and so, Γ [ Γ0 6= ?). Then
A ‘ Γ− _ Γ0−. By Disjunctive Equivalence and (AC9), it follows that
A ‘ (Γ;Γ0)−.
CASE 3: Γ0 [ 0 6= ? and Γ00 [ 00 6= ?. From (2), Disjunctive
Equivalence and (AC9), it follows that A ‘ (Γ0− _ 0+) _ (Γ00− _ 00+).
From this, (1) and (T13), it follows that A ‘ (Γ− _+)_ (Γ0− _0+). The
result follows from this, Disjunctive Equivalence and (AC9).
Proposition 5.4. (Completeness) For all TFFs A and B, if A  B, then
A ‘ B.
Proof. Suppose A 0 B. Then by proposition 5.2, 2v(A) B. Now A ‘ A, and
so by Disjunctive Equivalence and (AC9), A ‘ fAg+. By proposition
5.2, it follows that v(A) A. Thus by proposition 5.3, A 1 B.
Remark I. From this completeness result and the proof of the soundness of
AC, one can deduce that A  B i for every AC{valuation v, A v B. So we
might have adopted a dierent semantics for AC, dening ‘A semantically
contains B’ as ‘for every AC{valuation v, A v B’. The original notion of
semantic containment is simpler, hence my choice of it. But when dealing
with Angell’s 1977 system, we shall need the more complicated notion (with
restricted quantication on AC{valuations). The use of the later notion,
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however, seems to be in any case quite natural. For following Angell’s intu-
itions, which seem to be sound, p analytically contains q i p and p^ q carry
exactly the same information. But if two sentences p and q carry the same
information, then the truth of any sentence containing p implies the truth
of the corresponding sentence obtained by replacing one or more occurrence
of p by q, and conversely the falsity of any sentence containing p implies
the falsity of the corresponding sentence obtained by replacing one or more
occurrence of p by q. Now putting these intuitions together, it becomes quite
natural to adopt the more complicated notion of semantic containment in
order to model analytic containment. For A v B i for all nite sets of
TFFs Γ and , (a) Γ v A; i Γ v A ^ B;, and (b) Γ; A v  i
Γ; A ^B v .
Remark II. Let Min be the system whose axioms are:
 (AC6a),
 (AC6b),
 all formulas A ! B with A and B maximal Γ{formulas for some set
Γ, and
 all formulas A ! A[::B=B] and A ! A[B=::B],
and whose rules are:
 (AC9),
 A ! B ^ C =A ! B,
 A ! B ^ C =A ! C,
 A ! B; A ! C =A ! B ^C, and
 A ! B; C ! D =A ^ C ! B ^D.
Let us say that formula A semantically contains* formula B i B is true in
every valuation where A is true. It is quite easy to establish that if A ! B
is a theorem of Min, then A semantically contains* B. The converse holds
because in the above completeness proof for AC, only principles of Min have
been used except in the proof for proposition 5.3.
6. Getting New Consequence Relations
As we saw, Anderson and Belnap’s system of tautological entailments Efde
is AC plus A ! A _ B. Given the previous results, it is quite easy to
get a characterization of Efde in the present semantical framework. Let a
TE{valuation be a valuation v which satises the following condition:
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 For all nite sets of atoms Γ, Γ0,  and 0, if hΓ;i 2 v, then hΓ [
Γ0; [0i 2 v.
This property transmits to arbitrary TFFs, i.e. if v is a TE{valuation, then
if Γ v , then Γ;Γ0 v ;0 for all nite sets of TFFs Γ, Γ0,  and 0.
(A proof of this may be given following the method used in the proof of
proposition 4.1.) The semantics of TE{valuations validates A ! A _B, i.e.
for all TFFs A and B and every TE{valuation v, if A is true in v, then so
is A _ B. Given that TE{valuations are AC{valuations, Efde is sound with
respect to the semantics of TE{valuations. Completeness can be established
by noting that v(A) is a TE{valuation provided that axiom A ! A _ B is
accepted.
By adding axiom A ! B_:B to Efde, one gets a system PC for classical
consequence (A ‘ B i B is a classical consequence of A).6 Let a PC{
valuation be a TE{valuation which satises the following condition:
 For every nite non{empty set of atoms Γ, hΓ;Γi 2 v.
This property transmits to arbitrary TFFs, i.e. if v is a PC{valuation, then
Γ v Γ for every nite non{empty set of TFFs Γ. (As above, a proof may
be given following the method used in the proof of proposition 4.1.) The
semantics of PC{valuations validates A ! B _ :B: for every TFF B and
every PC{valuation v, B _ :B is true in v. So, PC is sound with respect to
the semantics of PC{valuations. Completeness can be established by noting
that v(A) is a PC{valuation if axiom A ! B _ :B is accepted.
Here is another modelling of classical consequence which involves certain
valuations which will be useful in the next section. Where c is any set
of atoms, we let ec be the valuation dened by ec = fhΓ; [ fAgi : A 2
c;Γ[ nite set of atomsg[fhΓ[fAg;i : A =2 c;Γ[ nite set of atomsg.
It is easy to see that ec is a PC{valuation.
Proposition 6.1. For every subset c of At, and for all TFFs A and B,
ec :A i 2ec A, and ec A _B i ec A or ec B.
Proof. (1) We rst prove that for all nite sets of TFFs Γ and  such
that Γ [  6= ?, Γ ec  i 9A 2 Γ A ec or 9A 2  ec A|which will
give us the second part of proposition 6.1. Given that ec is a PC{valuation,
6 One may wonder whether B^:B ! A should not also be added. This is not needed,
since Efde has the rule A ! B=:B ! :A. This rule can be shown to hold in AC +
A ! A _ B as follows. Suppose A ` B. Then by the rules of AC we get A _ B ` B, and
by the rules of AC + A ! A _B we get B ` A _B. So B a` A _B. By the rules of AC
it follows that :B a` :(A _B), and so :B a` :A ^ :B, and so :B ` :A.
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the right-to-left direction of the proposition is secured, so we just have to
prove the other direction of the proposition, which we shall call
`
. (a) By
denition of ec, ` holds for Γ and  sets of atoms. (b) Suppose that it holds
for all sets Γ and  of degree  n, and let Γ and  be such that Γ[ is of
degree n + 1 and Γ ec . We then decompose each of Γ and  into three
components as in the proof of proposition 4.1, and we have:
 Γ1;Γ2;Γ3 ec 1;2;3,
i.e., following the notational conventions of the proof of proposition 4.1:
 8x 2 −!Γ3 Γ1; x;2 ec 1; c3;Γ2.
By induction hypothesis, it follows that at least one of the following 3 con-
ditions hold:
1. 9A 2 1 [ c3 [ Γ2 ec A;
2. 9A 2 Γ1 [2 A ec;
3. 8x 2 −!Γ3 9A 2 x A ec.
By (1), 9A 2 1 ec A, or 9A 2 3 ec A (the fact that c is a PC{valuation
can be used to prove this), or 9A 2 Γ2 A ec. By (2), 9A 2 Γ1 A ec, or
9A 2 2 ec A. Finally, by (3) 9A 2 Γ3 A ec (this result is not immediate;
a proof by induction on the cardinal of Γ3 can be used to prove it).
(2) The rst part of proposition 6.1 can easily be proved by induction
on the degree of A, making use of the second part of the proposition which
has just been proved.
From this result it is clear that B is a classical consequence of A i for
every subset c of At, B is true in ec if A is.
The semantics of valuations captures properties of the truth{functional
connectives which are so general that it can be used to provide a characteri-
zation for a number of consequence relations, by imposing suitable conditions
on valuations.
7. The System AC*
I shall call my version of Angell’s 1977 system for analytic containment
‘AC*’.
The system is formulated in a classical propositional language L with
primitive operators : and _, augmented by the binary sentential operator !
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representing analytic containment. The formulas of the system are dened as
follows: all the TFFs of L are formulas; if A and B are TFFs, then A ! B is
a formula; all truth{functional compounds of formulas are formulas. I shall
use (as before) A, B, ... for TFFs, and X, Y , ... for arbitrary formulas.
Conjunction (^) and material implication () are dened as usual in terms
of : and _, and A $ B will be short for A ! B ^B ! A.
The system is dened by the following axiom schemata and rules:
A $ ::A (AC*1)
A ! A ^A (AC*2)
A ^B ! A (AC*3)
A _B ! B _A (AC*4)
A _ (B _ C) $ (A _B) _ C (AC*5)
A _ (B ^ C) $ (A _B) ^ (A _ C) (AC*6)
(A $ B)  (:A ! :B) (AC*7)
(A ! B)  (A _C ! B _ C) (AC*8)
(A ! B)  ((B ! C)  (A ! C)) (AC*9)
(A ! B)  (A  B) (AC*10)
X;X  Y = Y (AC*11)
AC* contains classical propositional logic as well as AC. For a comparison,
Angell’s original system in [2] is formulated as follows (with mutual analytic
containment $ taken as primitive, X ! Y dened as X $ (X^Y ); remem-
ber that in the 1977 system, the formation rules are unrestricted, so that a
formula may contain any number of nested $):
X $ ::X
X $ X ^X
X ^ Y $ Y ^X
X ^ (Y ^ Z) $ (X ^ Y ) ^ Z
X _ (Y ^ Z) $ (X _ Y ) ^ (X _ Z)
(X $ Y )  (:X $ :Y )
(X $ Y )  (X ^ Z $ Y ^ Z)
(X $ Y )  ((Y $ Z)  (X $ Z))
(X $ Y )  (Y $ X)
(X ! Y )  (X  Y )
X;X  Y = Y
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Let a model be any pair hc;Vi, where c is a subset of At and V is a set
of AC{valuations containing ec (see the previous section for the denition of
ec). Where m = hc;Vi is a model, truth in m|for short, m|is dened as
follows:
1. For A an atom, m A i A 2 c;
2. m :X i 2m X;
3. m X _ Y i m X or m Y ;
4. m A ! B i for every v in V, A v B.
(Reminder: A v B i for every set of TFFs Γ, (a) if Γ v A, then Γ v B,
and (b) A v Γ i A;B v Γ.) The clauses for conjunction and material
implication are then, unsurprisingly:
 m X ^ Y i m X and m Y ;
 m X  Y i 2m X or m Y .
We shall say that X is valid|for short,  X|i X is true in every model.
From proposition 6.1, it follows that:
Proposition 7.1. For every model m = hc;Vi and every TFF A, m A i
ec A.
Given the proof of the soundness of AC, it is clear that axioms (AC*1){
(AC*9) are valid. It is also obvious that rule (AC*11) preserves validity.
The soundness of AC* with respect to the proposed semantics follows from
the fact that axiom (AC*10) is valid, which follows from proposition 7.1.
(For suppose that A ! B is true in model m = hc;Vi. Then since ec 2 V,
2ec A or ec B, and so by proposition 7.1, 2m A or m B, i.e. A  B is true
in m.) Hence:
Proposition 7.2. (Soundness) Every theorem of AC* is valid.
For completeness, suppose that formula X0 is not a theorem of the sys-
tem, and let @ be a maximal consistent extension of f:X0g. Where A is
any TFF, we let v(A) be the set dened as follows:
 hΓ;i 2 v(A) i Γ [  6= ?, Γ [  is a nite set of atoms, and
A ! (Γ− _+) 2 @.
Each v(A) is obviously a valuation, and we can prove that it is indeed an
AC{valuation (adapt the proof of proposition 5.3). We then put c = At\@,
V = fv(A) : A 2 Lg [ fecg, and m = hc;Vi. m is then a model.
By a classical result, for all formulas X and Y , :X 2 @ i X =2 @, and
X _ Y 2 @ i X 2 @ or Y 2 @. Moreover:
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Proposition 7.3. For all TFFs A and B, A ! B 2 @ i for every v in V,
A v B.
Proof. Adapting the proof of proposition 5.1, we can prove that for all
nite sets of TFFs Γ and  such that Γ [  6= ?, and every TFF C,
Γ v(C)  i C ! (Γ− _ +) 2 @. (1) Suppose that A ! B 2 @, and
let v be in V. Then if v is ec, A v B can be proved using proposition
6.1. Suppose now that v is v(C) for some TFF C. A v B can be proved
using the fact that both (A ! B) ^ (C ! D _ A)  (C ! D _ B) and
(A ! B) ^ (C ! :A _D)  (C ! (:A _ :B) _D) are theorems of AC*.
(2) Suppose now that A ! B =2 @. Then 2v(A) B, and since v(A) A by the
theoremhood of A ! A, it follows that it is not the case that A v(A) B.
Thus we can establish that for every formula X, m X i X 2 @. Since
:X0 2 @, 2m X0, and so X0 is not valid. So since X0 was arbitrary:
Proposition 7.4. (Completeness) Every valid formula is a theorem of AC*.
Concluding Remark
Interesting developments of the previous material should go in at least the
following two directions: (i) building systems for analytic containment in
which formulas with nested arrows are taken into account, and specic ax-
ioms about such formulas are added, and (ii) getting a better understanding
of the kind of valuations which have been introduced in this paper.
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